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CIVIL RIGHTS - PROTECTION UNDER THE THIRTEENTH
AMENDMENT - HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
Until April 1968, the United States had no functional national
open housing law. By June, it had two. One was the comprehen-
sive statute passed by the 90th Congress in the wake of Dr. Martin
Luther King's death and signed into law by President Johnson on
April 11 - a statute whose detailed provisions run several pages
and thousands of words.' The other is a one-paragraph, 35-word
statute passed by the 39th Congress over the veto of President An-
drew Johnson 102 years ago.2 On June 17, 1968, in Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co.,3 the Supreme Court declared that this forgotten Re-
construction statute enacted under the 13th amendment bars all ra-
cial discrimination in the sale and rental of property. In so hold-
ing, the Court may have established the 13th amendment as a pow-
erful new tool to combat racial discrimination.
The plaintiffs in Jones were two federal employees, Joseph Lee
Jones, who is black, and his wife Barbara, a white. In June 1965,
the Joneses picked out a lot in Paddock Woods, a St. Louis, Mis-
souri, subdivision, owned by the Alfred H. Mayer Co. The couple's
offer to pay the advertised price to have a house built on the lot
was rejected because of Mr. Jones' color.
The Joneses filed suit in federal court, contending that their con-
stitutional rights had been infringed. At the heart of their argu-
ment was section 1982 of title 42 of the United States Code, which
provides that all citizens shall have the same right to purchase, sell,
hold, lease, or inherit real and personal property.4 This statute has
been judicially construed only a few times and has never been the
basis of a private discrimination suit by a Negro against a white. It
was originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the
nation's first anti-discrimination law, to implement the newly-rati-
fied 13th amendment.'
1 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (Supp. July 1968).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964).
3392 U.S. 409 (1968).
4 "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Ter-
ritory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964).
5 One reason for the limited use of section 1982 is that the Supreme Court had re-
peatedly held that this provision was directed solely at state action. This conclusion
was reached because section 1982, although originally enacted under the 13th amend-
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Although the 13th amendment bars only slavery and involun-
tary servitude,6 the Joneses argued that it was intended to abolish
all of slavery's vestiges, including racial discrimination. Since slaves
were legally incapable of buying or owning property, the Joneses
contended that private housing discrimination represented a
"badge"'7 of slavery, which was prohibited by section 1982 and by
the 13th amendment.
The badge of slavery argument was not new. It was often
made in civil rights cases during the post-Reconstruction years when
the memories of slavery were still fresh. Despite considerable his-
torical support," however, the contention that the 13th amendment
reached beyond slavery itself to mere discrimination was consistently
ment, which has no state action limitation, was later reenacted under the 14th amend-
ment by the Civil Rights Act of 1870. Thus in Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948),
where the Court held that enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant by the District
of Columbia courts violated section 1982 (then REV. STAT. § 1978) the Court stated:
"The action toward which the provisions of the statute under consideration is directed
is governmental action." Id. at 31. Accord, Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330-1
(1925); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16-18 (1883). See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 11 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948); Virginia v. Rives,
100 U.S. 313, 317-8, 333 (1879). Contra, United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (E.D.
Ark. 1903). It was on this basis that the District Court dismissed the complaint in
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 255 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Mo. 1966) and the Court of
Appeals affirmed, 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967).
The Supreme Court rejected this limitation in Jones, however. The Court found
that neither legislative history nor the political conditions of the times furnished "the
slightest factual basis" for the theory that the readoption of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 under the 14th amendment was meant to limit the Act to state action. 392 U.S.
at 436.
For one of the few discussions of section 1982, see Robison, The Possibility of a
Frontal Assault on the State Action Concept, with Special Reference to the Right to
Purchase Real Property Guaranteed in 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 41 NonE DAME LAW. 455
(1966). Robison was one of the lawyers for the Joneses in the instant case.
6"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States,
or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST., amend. XIII, § 1.
7Brief for Petitioner at 12, Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
8 In J. TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTBENTH AMEND-
MENT (1951), the author marshals significant historical evidence from the congres-
sional debates over the 13th amendment to demonstrate that both supporters and
opponents viewed its scope as extending far beyond the simple abolition of the legal
institution of slavery. The amendment, tenBroek writes, was thought by all to guarantee
to the freed Negro "a basic minimum of rights - equality before the law, protection
in life and person, [and] opportunity to live, work, and move about .... Id. at 143.
This intention was cheered by the Republicans as the "consummation of abolitionism"
and attacked by conservatives as an unwarranted expansion of federal power into the
domestic affairs of the states. Id. at 142-44. But its significance was recognized by all.
One of the spurs for this broad interpretation, at least among the amendment's sup-
porters, was the realization that the free Negro, in both the North and South, was only
slightly better off than his enslaved brother. The free "man of color" was still nearly
as degraded and restricted as he had been under slavery; he, too, was to be liberated by
the 13th amendment. Id. at 148. See also note 18 infra.
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rejected by the Supreme Court. Thus, in the Civil Rights Cases,9
while acknowledging that the 13th amendment decreed "universal
civil and political freedom throughout the United States,"'1 the
Court refused to hold that discrimination in public accommodations
constituted an incident of slavery forbidden by the amendment.
The Court thought that "[ilt would be running the slavery argu-
ment into the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimina-
tion .... "11 This theme was repeated 13 years later in Plessy v.
Ferguson,'" which established the separate but equal doctrine. Up-
holding a Louisiana statute requiring racial segregation on railroad
cars, the Court in Plessy declared that the law merely implied a legal
distinction between the races - "a distinction which .. .must al-
ways exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other
race by color" - and did not reestablish slavery.13
The final blow to the badge of slavery argument came in Hodges
v. United States.'4  There a group of whites who had terrorized
black workmen into leaving their jobs at a white-owned sawmill
were convicted of conspiring to prevent the Negroes from exercis-
ing their right to contract for employment. While recognizing that
"one of the disabilities of slavery, one of the indicia of its existence,
was a lack of power to make or perform contracts,"' 5 the Court re-
versed the conviction, holding that "no mere personal assault or
trespass" - although racially motivated - reduced an individual to
slavery.' 6 Thus the Supreme Court's position was dear: only con-
duct which held a person "in a condition of enforced compulsory
service"'1 was barred by the 13th amendment.18
9 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
'Old. at 22.
11 Id. at 24. In dictum, the Court appeared to accept the badge of slavery argument
when applied to "fundamental rights" - such as the right to make contracts, to sue
and give evidence, and to buy and sell property - as opposed to mere "social rights,"
such as equal access to public accommodations. Id. at 20-25. However, in Hodges v.
United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), the Court refused to apply the badge of slavery con-
cept to protect Negroes' right to contract for employment. For an excellent discussion
of the 13th and 14th amendments, centering on an analysis of the Civil Rights Cases,
see Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGE3RS L. REv. 387, 387-
414 (1967).
12 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
13 ld. at 543.
14203 U.S. 1 (1906).
15id. at 17.
16Id. at 18.
17Id. at 16. The Court has extended its interpretation of the 13th amendment's
ban on slavery and involuntary servitude to include peonage. Thus, in Clyatt v. United
States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905), the Court upheld the validity of two federal anti-peonage
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Against this background, with the 1968 Fair Housing Law only
2 months old, the Supreme Court reversed a century of restrictive in-
terpretation of the 13th amendment. 9 Relying primarily on the
legislative history of the amendment, the Court concluded that both
its Congressional supporters and opponents had viewed the amend-
statutes enacted under the 13th amendment, REV. STAT. §§ 1990 and 5526 (now 42
U.S.C. § 1994 (1964) and 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1964).) In Bailey v. Alabama, 219
US.. 219 (1911), the Court relied on the 13th amendment to reverse a conviction un-
der an Alabama statute which provided criminal sanctions for an employee who entered
into a labor contract with intent to defraud his employer. The statute provided that
failure to perform the contract was prima fade evidence of fraudulent intent. Accord,
Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133
(1914).
I8Although the majority of the Supreme Court had rejected the badge of slavery
argument, it was vigorously espoused in repeated dissents by the first Justice Harlan,
and on occasion by other judges. Thus, arguing for the affirmance of the conspiracy
conviction in Hodges, Justice Harlan wrote of the 13th amendment:
Although in words and form prohibitive, yet, in law, by its own force, that
Amendment destroyed slavery and all its incidents and badges, and established
freedom. It also conferred upon every person . .. the right, without dis-
crimination against them on account of their race, to enjoy all the privileges
that inhere in freedom. 203 U.S. at 27.
Justice Harlan found discrimination in public accommodations to be a forbidden badge
of servitude in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 43; see Kinoy, supra note 11, at 407-
10. He reached the same conclusion about railroad segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. at 562 (1896).
Although they did not join in Harlan's dissents, Supreme Court Justices Bradley and
Swayne also supported the badge of slavery argument on occasion. In Blyew v. United
States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1871), dissenting from a decision that crippled a
Congressional attempt to extend federal jurisdiction in civil rights cases, they wrote:
Merely striking off the fetters of the slave, without removing the incidents
and consequences of slavery, would hardly have been a boon to the colored
race .... The power to enforce the [13th] amendment by appropriate leg-
islation must be a power to do away with the incidents and consequences of
slavery, and to instate the freedmen in the full enjoyment of that civil liberty
and equality which the abolition of slavery meant. Id. at 601.
The only decision before Jones to hold that the 13th amendment enables Congress
to prohibit badges of slavery was United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (E.D. Ark. 1903),
also involving section 1982 (then Rev. Stat. § 1978). There, a band of white men
was charged with conspiring to intimidate Negroes seeking to lease farmland. Uphold-
ing the indictment against demurrer, the court declared that the deprivation of funda-
mental rights, such as the right to lease land, because of race was an "element of ser-
vitude" banned by the 13th amendment. 125 F. at 330.
19The second Justice Harlan, in a dissent joined by Justice White, suggested that
the passage of the 1968 housing law so diminished the public significance of Jones
that the Court should have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
He pointed out that the type of relief which the petitioners sought would be available
in seven months since the new law prohibited discrimination by subdivision developers
like Alfred H. Mayer Co. after January 1969. 392 U.S. at 477-78 (dissenting opinion).
Justice Harlan said it was particularly inappropriate for the Court to extend national
fair housing coverage beyond that which Congress "in its wisdom" had chosen to pro-
vide in the 1968 law. Id. at 478.
In reply, the majority stated only that since the 1968 law had a 180-day statute of
limitations, the petitioners' claim would be barred before the new act became effective.
Id. at 417-18 n.21.
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ment as an instrument to abolish the vestiges of servitude as well as
slavery itself.20 "I have no doubt," the Court quoted one of the
amendment's draftsmen as saying, "that under this provision .. .
we may destroy all these discriminations in civil rights against the
black man; and if we cannot, our constitutional amendment amounts
to nothing."21
Although the Court sidestepped the question of whether the
amendment outlawed slavery's incidents by its own force,22 the
Court found it clear that the amendment's enabling clause empow-
ered Congress to prohibit badges of slavery by legislation.23  Revers-
ing Hodges as "incompatible with the history and purpose of the
20 392 U.S. at 439-40. Although the Court cited dicta from a few cases to support
its decision, it is significant that the Jones opinion relied almost entirely on a very brief
survey of the legislative history to justify its new interpretation of the 13th amendment.
While this history does seem to uphold the Court's view (see note 8 supra), only the
most naive would fail to recognize that the Court's action was basically political -
more a reflection of its procivil rights stance than of legal logic. Jones is a case, like
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which lends great support to Lerner's
thesis: "At the heart of these polemics is the recognition that the real meaning of the
Court is to be found in the political rather than the legal realm, and that its concern is
more significantly with power politics than with judicial technology." Lerner, The
Supreme Court and American Capitalism, 42 YAL1 L.J. 668, 669 (1933). This fact
should not detract from the Court's decision, however, particularly since it was 19th
century Court's anti-civil rights views - not legal considerations - that led it to take
the restrictive view of the 13th amendment that the Jones Court reversed.
21 392 U.S. at 440.
2 2 Id. at 439. For further discussion of this point, see text accompanying note 63
infra.
2 392 U.S. at 439. The Court's decision in Jones that the 13th amendment's ena-
bling clause has a broader scope than the amendment itself is in line with similar recent
holdings concerning the enabling clauses of the 14th and 15th amendments. Thus, in
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), six justices in two concurring opinions
suggested in dictum that legislation enacted under section 5 of the 14th amendment
could reach purely private conspiracies, although the substantive provisions of the
amendment bar only state discriminatory action. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966), while conceding that the 14th amendment itself did not bar all literacy
tests, the Court upheld a congressional ban on the use of English literacy tests against
individuals who had completed the sixth grade in Puerto Rican schools. The Court
held that Congress might well have found that the voting power which would result
from the prohibition on literacy tests would help Puerto Ricans obtain equal protection
of the laws generally. Finally, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966),
the Court upheld a number of provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973 a-p (Supp. II, 1967), that went beyond the 15th amendment's simple ban on
state discrimination in voting.
In each case the Court found that the draftsmen of the enabling clauses sought to
give Congress the same powers to enforce the amendments as are expressed in the nec-
essary and proper clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The traditional formulation
of those powers was stated in McCulloch v. Maryland: "Let the end be legitimate, let
it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421
(1819).
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Amendment,"24 the Court declared: "Surely Congress has the power
under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are
the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to trans-
late that determination into effective legislation."25  Section 1982,
the Court found, was enacted pursuant to this Congressional power
under the 13th amendment to abolish the vestiges of slavery. The
right to buy, sell, and own property, said the Court, is a funda-
mental right that was denied to the bondsman by slavery, and later
to the Negro freedman by the Black Codes and by segregation.
The Court thus concluded that residential discrimination, which
"herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property
turn on the color of their skin," is a relic of slavery. 6
The immediate impact of the Jones decision is to resurrect sec-
tion 1982 as a national open housing law. In so doing, the Court
emphasized that section 1982 lacks the comprehensive scope of the
Fair Housing Title of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.2Y While the
1968 law bars discrimination on grounds of race, color, religion, or
national origin, the Court found that the older statute prohibits
only racial discrimination2 Furthermore, section 1982 fails to
reach the range of incidental services subject to the new law: First,
the 1968 law prohibits unequal treatment by real estate brokers"
and by banks and other financial agencies;"' section 1982 does not.8 2
Second, unlike the 1968 law,3 3 section 1982 does not bar advertising
or other representations that indicate discriminatory preferences. 4
Finally, the older law does not reach discrimination in the providing
of services or facilities in connection with the sale or rental of hous-
ing.3
In terms of remedies also, section 1982 falls short of the 1968
Fair Housing Law. Under section 1982, relief can be obtained only
by a private civil action,86 and the statute itself, couched in declara-
24392 U.S. at 443 n.78.
25d. at 440.
26 Id. at 44 1-3.
271d. at 413.
2842 U.S.C.A. §§ 3604-6 (Supp. July 1968).
29 392 U.S. at 413. See text accompanying notes 64-76 infra.
80 42 U.S.C.A. § 3606 (Supp. July 1968).
31 Id. § 3605.
32 392 U.S. at 413.
3342 U.S.C.A. §§ 3604(c)-(e) (Supp. July 1968).
34 392 U.S. at 413.
35Id. Contrast 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(b) (Supp. July 1968).
36 392 U.S. at 417.
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tory terms, provides no explicit method of enforcement.3 7 In Jones,
however, the Supreme Court held that this fact did not bar a federal
court from granting effective equitable relief - in this case, an in-
junction ordering defendants to sell the Joneses a house at the 1965
market price.3 ' The Court declined to decide under what circum-
stances compensatory or punitive damages might be awarded under
section 1982.39
The 1968 law, on the other hand, explicitly allows injunctive re-
lief, compensatory damages, and up to $1000 punitive damages in
a civil suit.40  In addition to permitting private suits, the new statute
provides for the establishment of a federal administrative agency
under the Department of Housing and Urban Development that
would investigate complaints of unequal treatment and would at-
tempt to eliminate discriminatory practices by informal concilia-
tion.41  Only if the agency were unable to reach such an informal
agreement with the discriminating party would the complainant
have to seek formal judicial relief.4' The new law also empowers
the Attorney General to file a civil action against persons engaging
in a pattern or practice of housing discrimination43 and provides
criminal penalties for intimidation or harassment of persons exer-
cising rights under the act.44
Although section 1982 is weaker in some respects than the 1968
371d. at 414 n.13.
381d. at 414 nn.13 & 14.
391d. at 414-15 n.14. However, the Court strongly implied that compensatory
damages, if proved, could be granted. It cited, without comment, Wyandotte Transport
Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202, 204 (1967); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684
(1946); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 207 (1944); Texas & Pac. R.R.
v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916); and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In Bell the Court held
that where a federal statute provides only a general right to sue for invasion of legal
rights, federal courts should use "any available remedy" to grant appropriate relief. 327
U.S. at 684. A similar right to damages was inferred from federal statutes which made
no express provision for damages in the other three cases. Section 1988 provides that
in federal civil rights suits, the district courts should look to state and common law to
supplement federal law, if federal statutes do not provide "suitable remedies."
4042 U.S.C.A. § 3612(c) (Supp. July 1968).
41 Id. §§ 3608-11.
42Id. § 3610(d). This section provides, however, that a complainant may not
bring an action in federal court if a state or local fair housing law provides rights and
remedies "substantially equivalent" to those under the federal law. Likewise, section
3610(c) requires the federal administrator to defer to the appropriate state or local
agency during the informal concilation procedures. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(c) (Supp.
July 1968).
43 Id. § 3613.
44 Id. § 3631. Penalties include up to $1000 fine and one year imprisonment, or,
if bodily injury results, up to $10,000 fine and 10 years in jail. In case of death, the
defendent may be sentenced to life imprisonment.
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housing law, it is stronger in two ways. First, the Reconstruction
statute covers all homes and apartments, 45 including the single-fam-
ily house sold or rented without the aid of a broker and the owner-
occupied apartment building containing fewer than five units, both
of which are exempted by the 1968 law. 6 Second, section 1982 is
fully effective immediately, while under the 1968 law, most apart-
ments were not covered until January 1 9 6 9,41 and private homes,
not until 1970.
The Jones decision did more than revive a forgotten statute,
however; it redefined a forgotten amendment. As a prohibition
against slavery, the 13th amendment's force was largely spent by
the time it was ratified. As a ban on the badges of slavery, how-
ever, the 13th's potential impact is great. 9 In fact, it may prove
the most effective legal weapon against racial discrimination.
Because the 14th amendment is- limited to state action, 0 the
Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 have been based primarily on
congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. This reliance
on the commerce clause51 has been criticized both as impractical and
inappropriate.> Thus, Justice Douglas, concurring in Hear't of At-
lanta Motel v. United States53 and Katzenbach v. McClung,M argued
that using the commerce clause to outlaw racial discrimination in
public accommodations has an unsettling effect because of the need
constantly to litigate whether a particular restaurant is within the
commerce definition of the act, or whether a particular customer is
an interstate traveler.5 5 Justice Douglas also criticized the com-
merce clause approach to civil rights because, he said, the right to
be free from racial discrimination "occupies a more protected posi-
45 392 U.S. at 413.
4642 U.S.C.A. § 3603(b) (1) (2) (Supp. July 1968).
47Id. § 3603 (a) (2).
48Id. § 3603(b) (1).
4 9 As Justice Douglas wrote: "Some badges of slavery remain today. While the
institution has been outlawed, it has remained in the minds and hearts of many white
men. Cases which have come to this Court depict a spectacle of slavery unwilling to
die." 392 U.S. at 445 (concurring opinion). He then listed many of the racial dis-
crimination cases which the Court has decided during the past 30 years. Id. at 445-49.
5 OBut see United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), discussed note 23 supra,
where six justices, concurring in dictum, suggested that private conspiracies can be out-
lawed under section 5 of the 14th amendment.
51 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, ci. 3.
52 See Solomon & Yates, Riots, Congress and Interstate Commerce, 45 J. URBAN
L. 735, 758-63 (1968).
53 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
54379 U.S. 294 (1964).
55 379 U.S. at 280.
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tion in our constitutional system than does the movement of cattle,
fruit, steel and coal across state lines."56
The 13th amendment badge of slavery approach avoids both
the state action limitation of the 14th amendment and the practical
and conceptual shortcomings of the commerce clause. Unlike the
14th amendment, the 13th has repeatedly been held to reach pri-
vate action, a point reaffirmed by the Court in Jones.17 As a provi-
sion intending to "secure to the oppressed slave his natural and
God-given rights," 58 the 13th amendment provides a more appropri-
ate basis than the commerce clause for the legislation of racial
equality.
In view of the leeway given Congress to decide what constitutes
a vestige of slavery, probably any substantial racial discrimination
could be reached under the 13th amendment. The only limitation
enunciated in Jones was that Congress' determination must be ra-
tional. Thus, it appears that Congress could prohibit discrimina-
tion by fraternities, churches, or private clubs.5 9 In the economic
sphere, the Jones opinion spells out clearly how broad the congres-
sional mandate is: "At the very least, the freedom that Congress
is empowered to secure under the Thirteenth Amendment includes
the freedom to buy whatever a white man can buy, the right to live
wherever a white man can live.""°  In short, Congress can ensure
that "a dollar in the hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing
56 Id. at 279, quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (Douglas,
J., concurring opinion). See Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Heart of Atlanta
Motel, 379 U.S. at 291.
57392 U.S. at 438; Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216-18 (1905); Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883).
58 J. TENBROEK, supra note 8, at 146.
59 In fact, the Court may already have prohibited discrimination in private country
clubs. In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 392 U.S. 657 (1968), decided the
same day as Jones, a private corporate country club in Virginia refused to approve a
white shareholder's assignment of his shares to a Negro. In a per curiam opinion, the
Court granted certiorari, vacated the Virginia court's judgment, and remanded "for fur-
ther consideration in light of Jones v. Alfred Mayer." Id. Because the decision was
per curiam, its precise rationale and significance are unclear. However, since it cited
Jones, the Court in Sullivan probably relied on 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964), which bars
discrimination in the conveyance of personal and real property. Thus, the Court may
have reasoned that the club's refusal to allow the assignment of shares to a Negro was
a denial of his right to acquire personal property. Furthermore, since membership in
the country club probably includes the right to use the club's park and swimming pool,
denial of membership could be considered a refusal to convey an easement, a real prop-
erty interest. Under the easement theory, the Sullivan decision might apply to resi-
dential fraternities, where membership carries a right to occupy the fraternity's living
quarters, or to private eating clubs, with their dining facilities. Most significantly,
such results could be reached under section 1982, without the need of any additional
legislation. See note 63 infra & accompanying text.
60 392 U.S. at 443.
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as a dollar in the hands of a white man."'" This would certainly
suggest that physicians, dentists, lawyers and barbers could be re-
quired to give equal service. Finally, legislation based on the 13th
amendment could, as in the housing field, fill the gaps left in ex-
isting anti-discrimination statutes based on the commerce clause.
Both the public accommodations and the employment provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, are limited to enterprises
affecting interstate commerce, and consequently each exempts a sub-
stantial number of small establishments."2
The above discussion has been predicated on the assumption
that legislation under the 13th amendment's enabling clause is re-
quired to end badges of slavery. But the Court in Jones left open
the possibility that such badges may be barred by the amendment
itself without enabling legislation. 3  The Court, of course, did not
have to reach this issue in Jones, because section 1982 was already
on the books. The fact that the Court actually posed the issue, how-
ever, may indicate that the majority is ready to be persuaded that the
13th amendment bars incidents of slavery without legislation. If
this is so - and the issue is likely to be litigated soon - this would
greatly increase the amendment's effectiveness as a civil rights tool,
because the courts could then extend the amendment's coverage
through judicial construction, avoiding the need to rely on a politi-
cally sensitive Congress.
The Court may have built one severe limitation into the 13th
amendment approach when it wrote in Jones that section 1982 deals
6l ld.
62 The public accommodations provision exempts owner-occupied inns with fewer
than six rooms for rent. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 a(b) (1) (1964). The employment title
exempts employers with fewer than 25 employees. Id. § 2000 e(b).
it could well be argued that not only all jobs and public accommodations, but also
all doctors, lawyers, etc., are already covered by federal civil rights legislation. Taking
a job, stopping at a motel, and buying the services of a doctor or lawyer all involve
making contracts, and section 1981 provides: "All persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964). Like section 1982, section 1981
is derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and it is unlikely that the Supreme Court
would interpret the "right to make and enforce contracts" any more narrowly than it
did the right to "purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property" in
Jones. In fact, the Jones court specifically overruled Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S.
1 (1906), which had narrowly interpreted section 1981, (then Rev. Stat. § 1977).
See text accompanying notes 14-6, 23 supra.
The Court wrote:
'By its own unaided force and effect," the Thirteenth Amendment "abol-
ished slavery, and established universal freedom." [Citation omitted.]
Whether or not the Amendment itself did any more than that - a question
not involved in this case - it is at least dear that the Enabling Clause of the
Amendment empowered Congress to do much more. 392 U.S. at 439.
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only with racial - and not religious or national - discrimination.64
Whether the Court was referring only to section 1982 or whether it
meant that any protection based on the 13th amendment must be so
restricted is not clear. In either case, however, such a judicial limi-
tation is unnecessary and unwise. First, the language of both statute
and amendment is broad. Section 1982 declares that "all citizens
shall have the same right" to hold property;65 the 13th amendment
states without reservation, "Neither slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude ... shall exist within the United States."
Second, there is considerable precedent for applying both amend-
ment and statute to non-Negroes. In Hodges v. United States, the
Supreme Court wrote that the 13th amendment "reaches every race
and every individual .. . .Slavery or involuntary servitude of the
Chinese, or the Italian, of the Anglo-Saxon are as much within its
compass as slavery or involuntary servitude of the African."66 Like-
wise, in Bailey v. Alabama, the 13th amendment, although original-
ly aimed at blacks, was found to be a "charter of universal civil
freedom" for persons of all races and colors.17  Without regard to
race, federal anti-peonage statutes enacted under the 13th amend-
ment have been upheld,68 and state laws perpetuating peonage have
been struck down.69 Section 1982 has been invoked by the courts
to protect the property rights of a white man in Buchanan v. War-
ley70 and of Japanese-Americans in Oyama v. California7' and State
v. Ikeda.72
64 Id. at 413. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
6 Section 1982 does say, however, ". .. the same right. . . as is enjoyed by white
citizens ...."
66203 U.S. at 17 (1906).
67219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911). Accord, United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785,
793 (No. 16,151) (C.C.D. Ky. 1866).
68 United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914) (race of peon not apparent);
Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905) (fact that peon was Negro is mentioned
only in dissent).
69 Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942) (race not apparent); Bailey v. Alabama,
219 U.S. 219 (1911) (importance of fact that peon was Negro is explicitly discounted
by Court).
70245 U.S. 60 (1917). Accord, Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927). More-
over, supporters of the 13th amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 intended
both provisions to apply to whites. The whites considered in need of such national
protection were the poor white Southerner, "impoverished, debased, dishonored by the
system that makes toil a badge of disgrace," and the loyal southern whites "who have
been reduced from men almost to chattels because of their fidelity to our flag, to our
constitution, and to this country." J. TENBROEK, supra note 8, at 146, 162.
71332 U.S. 633 (1948).
7261 Ariz. 41, 143 P.2d 880 (1943). Section 1981 of title 42 of the United
States Code, which is also derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, has been held
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
Finally, the 14th amendment, which was also passed to protect
Negro rights, has been expanded by interpretation to cover not only
individuals of all races and national origins,17 but even corpora-
tions. 74 There is no solid reason why the Court's interpretation of
the 13th amendment should not be similarly expanded to protect at
least all persons. 5  Thus, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. could be-
come the landmark decision in expanding the 13th amendment as
Brown v. Board of Education78 was for the 14th. Using the badge
of slavery rationale, Congress or the courts could bar even non-
commercial private discrimination which thus far has been beyond
the reach of either the 14th amendment or the commerce clause. If
so, the 13th amendment may become - albeit a century late - the
dynamic weapon in the fight for equality that its framers intended.
ELLEN CUMMINGS
to protect a resident alien Japanese. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S.
410, 419 (1948). In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 695-6 (1898),
the Court stated that section 1981 (then REv. STAT. § 1977) applies to persons of
every race, color, and nationality.
73E.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (white); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) (Mexican); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (white); Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (Mexican); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(white); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (Chinese).
74 E.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. P.
Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
75 It might be argued that the protection of Negroes, to the exclusion of other
groups, violates the concept of equal protection which, in federal law, is embodied in
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954). But see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 394 U.S. 641, 657-8 (1966), where the
Court rejected a similar argument, stating that a statute is not constitutionally invalid
because it might have gone farther than it did.
76347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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